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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. § 
78-2a-3(2), and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal following the Appellant's entry of a 
guilty plea to the offense of Forgery, a second degree felony, in 
violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-501. Judgment was entered on the 
guilty plea on November 7, 1988 by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, 
Third District Court Judge. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Defendant's guilty plea was received in 
compliance with Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the decisional law construing that provision. 
2. Did the Defendant receive effective assistance of 
counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 20, 1987, Barbara Harris was arrested at the 
Harmons grocery store after attempting to cash a check which was 
determined to be a forgery. While Ms. Harris was being detained, 
she was asked by the Harmons security guard if anyone was with 
her. She answered "that there was a gold car out in the parking 
lot with the other people that were with her." (8/16/88 T. 6). 
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Once a deputy sheriff arrived at the scene, the security guard 
advised him of the forgery situation inside the store and that 
accessories might be located in a suspect vehicle in the Harmons 
parking lot (8/16/88 T. 7-8). The deputy sheriff then pulled his 
patrol vehicle behind the gold Cadillac which was the only gold 
vehicle in the parking lot (8/16/88 T. 7), activated his overhead 
lights, and stopped the gold vehicle. One female and one male 
occupant were observed in the vehicle. The Appellant was the 
male occupant. According to the security guard, permission was 
requested and given to search the vehicle by the Appellant 
(8-16-88 T. 11). 
The Appellant's Motion to Suppress was denied. In announc-
ing its ruling, the trial court stated that, "There was probable 
cause to make a stop. In any event, the court will deny the 
motion to suppress that evidence obtained pursuant to that 
arrest." (8/16/88 T. 36). 
On September 12, 1988, the Appellant was scheduled to 
proceed to trial. At the request of Salt Lake County Attorney 
David Yocom, one of his former law partners, James Barber, 
appeared in court as counsel for the Appellant (9/12/88 T.2,3). 
The Appellant pleaded guilty to Count III of the Third Amended 
Information which alleged Forgery, a second degree felony, in 
violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-501. The court relied heavily upon a 
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guilty plea affidavit in receiving the guilty plea. There was no 
on the record compliance with Rule 11(e)(3) of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The court ordered the Appellant to serve the 
indeterminate term provided by law of 1-15 years at the Utah 
State Prison. The Appellant is presently serving that sentence. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the time that the Defendant entered his guilty plea, the 
law in Utah required strict compliance with Rule 11(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the Appellant exe-
cuted an Affidavit when he pleaded guilty which recited that a 
guilty plea necessarily waived an accused's rights to confronta-
tion, to cross-examine the witnesses against him, to a jury 
trial, and to an appeal, the burden for ensuring Rule 11(e) 
compliance was squarely on the judge, and an Affidavit was not a 
sufficient substitute for Rule 11(e) compliance on the record at 
the time that the guilty plea was entered. The failure of the 
trial court to fulfill the requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) on the 
record at the time the Defendant entered his plea mandates 
setting aside the Appellant's guilty plea and conviction. 
On the morning that the Appellant's case was scheduled to go 
to trial, a respected and experienced defense lawyer appeared in 
court at the request of the County Attorney to assist the Appel-
lant. Although defense counsel should be commended for his 
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willingness to volunteer his services on short notice, he was, 
under the circumstances, incapable of rendering effective assis-
tance to the Appellant. Counsel could not intelligently assess 
the propriety of the denial of the Motion to Suppress without 
reviewing the police reports and a transcript of the testimony at 
the suppression hearing. By pleading guilty, the Appellant 
waived his right to challenge the trial judge's denial of his 
Motion to Suppress. However, the stop of the Appellant's motor 
vehicle was not supported by an articulable suspicion; and as a 
result, the order denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress was 
erroneous. Competent and effective counsel would not have 
presumed to advise an accused to plead guilty without a more 
thorough understanding of the search issue. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH RULE 11(e)(3) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, AND STATE V. GIBBONS 
At the time that the Appellant pleaded guilty to Forgery, 
the trial court erred by failing to comply with the requirements 
of Rule 11(e)(3). That rule states as follows: "The court. . . 
shall not accept [a plea of guilty] until the court has made the 
findings: (3) that the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront 
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and cross-examine in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of those rights." 
The record evidence from the change of plea hearing clearly 
establishes that the trial court failed to make a specific 
inquiry as to whether the Appellant understood that by entering 
his plea, he waived his rights against self-incrimination, to 
confrontation, to a jury trial, and to appeal. Failure to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) necessitates setting aside 
the guilty plea. 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring constitutional and Rule 11(e) 
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." 
Id. at 1312. Gibbons was decided on June 30, 1987. The Appel-
lant pleaded guilty in the instant matter on September 12, 1988. 
Strict, and not just substantial, compliance with the rule is 
therefore required. State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 
(Utah App. 1988). The record as a whole test applies only in 
pre-Gibbons cases. See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 
1985). 
The basis for the Gibbons duty imposed upon trial courts is 
found in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
5 
[What is at stake for an accused facing punish-
ment] demands the utmost solicitude of which 
courts are capable in canvassing the matter 
with the accused to make sure he has a full 
understanding of what the plea connotes and of 
its consequence. 
395 U.S. at 243-244. 
In the instant matter, the trial judge relied heavily upon 
an affidavit which the Appellant signed and acknowledged that he 
had read (9/12/88 T. 4). Before accepting the Appellant's guilty 
plea, the trial court did review the possible penalty (T.6), as 
well as the elements and a factual basis for the guilty plea 
(T.6-7). However, the court never engaged in any conversation 
with the Appellant whereby the court informed the Appellant that 
by entering his guilty plea he would be waiving his rights 
against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to appeal, or to 
confront the witnesses against him in open court. These rights 
were contained in the affidavit executed by the Appellant. 
However, the recitation of the rights in the affidavit does not 
satisfy the mandate of Gibbons and Vasilacopulos. 
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court imposed the burden of 
establishing compliance with Rule 11(e) squarely on the trial 
judge. Affidavits do not take the place of on the record compli-
ance with Rule 11(e): 
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote 
efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the 
starting point, not an end point, in the plead-
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ing process The trial judge should 
then review the statements in the affidavit 
with the defendant, question the defendant 
concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill 
the other requirements imposed by section 77-
35-11 on the record before accepting the guilty 
plea. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 1313-1314 
In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989), 
this Court repeated the requirement that the trial judge may not 
rely upon an affidavit as a substitute for on the record compli-
ance with Rule 11(e): 
But, if such an affidavit or form is signed by 
the accused and used as part of the guilty plea 
to evidence his or her understanding of the 
charged offense and waiver of certain rights, 
that statement cannot serve as a mere substi-
tute for the full and complete examination on 
the record by the trial court as required by 
the rule. (Emphasis added). 
At the guilty plea hearing, the court did inquire, "Are you 
entering that plea voluntarily?" The Appellant responded in the 
affirmative (T.8). However, mere general questions which ask 
whether a plea is "voluntary" are insufficient under Rule 11(e). 
State v. Valencia, supra, at 1335. Indeed, as to a Rule 11(e)(3) 
deficiency, this Court in Valencia observed: 
Specific inquiry should be made as to whether 
defendant understands that by his plea he 
waives his rights against self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial, to appeal and to confront 
witnesses Instead, the court relied 
only upon the form statement, which of itself 
was deficient, mandating that we reverse the 
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conviction and the refusal to set aside the 
plea. 
Id. at 1335. 
The Appellant has not moved to set aside his guilty plea at 
the trial court. The Rule 11(e)(3) error was only identified 
after the Notice of Appeal and original Docketing Statement were 
filed. Just as in Gibbons, if the motion were unsuccessful, an 
appeal would then be taken, resulting in two appeals in the same 
case. Additionally, in certain cases, this Court may consider 
the failure to comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons as error suffi-
ciently manifest and fundamental to be first raised on appeal to 
this Court. State v. Valencia, supra, at 1332-1334. According-
ly, this Court should reach the merits of Appellant's argument. 
Appellant has established non-compliance with Rule 11(e)(3), 
thereby necessitating reversal of the conviction. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court established the standard for determining the 
existence of ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to 
prevail on such a claim, a defendant must show, first, that his 
or her counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demon-
strable manner, which fell below an objective standard of reason-
able professional judgment and, second, that counsel's perform-
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ance prejudiced the defendant. Accord: State v. Carter, 776 
P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). 
Deficient Representation 
In the instant matter, the Appellant was represented by a 
variety of appointed counsel as well as at least one private 
counsel prior to the date set for trial. On the date of the 
guilty plea, the matter was actually scheduled for trial and the 
Appellant was representing himself. At the request of Salt Lake 
County Attorney, David Yocom, a former law partner, James Barber, 
appeared in court on the spur of the moment. Mr. Barber arrived 
to Court in casual attire. He explained his informal dress to 
the court as follows: 
May I apologize, your Honor, for appearing 
without the appropriate accoutrements. But I 
did so at Mr. Yocomfs request and hope the 
court will condone that. 
(9/12/88 T.2). 
Mr. Barber is an extremely able and well respected defense 
counsel. He is certainly to be commended for his willingness to 
drop everything and hurry over to court to assist a pro se defen-
dant. However, in doing so, Mr. Barber undertook the responsi-
bility of representing an accused (9/12/88 T.3). He had no 
familiarity with the facts, legal issues, or possible defenses 
that were available to the Appellant. Indeed, his only role was 
to stand beside the Appellant during the entry of the plea. 
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Under similar circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the right to counsel was "not satisfied by a sham or pre-
tense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests 
no real concern about the interests of the accused." Alires v. 
Turner, 449 P.2d 241 (Utah 1969). In Alires, in response to the 
Defendant's request for counsel at the arraignment in the dis-
trict court, the judge appointed an attorney who simply happened 
to be in the courtroom at the time. After a brief conference 
with the defendant, a guilty plea was entered. On appeal, in 
granting the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court 
agreed with the petitioner that the representation that he re-
ceived was merely a perfunctory appearance for the record, and 
that he in effect had no counsel at all. Id. at 242. 
From an objective standard, competent defense counsel would 
not presume to assess a criminal defendant's case in a matter of 
minutes before shepherding an accused through a guilty plea. In 
order to reach an intelligent judgment about the likelihood of 
prevailing on suppression issues or at trial, it would be neces-
sary to take time to review the police reports in a given case. 
Moreover, in order to assess the Fourth Amendment violation, 
counsel needed to review a transcript of the testimony from the 
suppression hearing. No transcript had yet been ordered to that 
was clearly not done in the instant matter. 
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Prejudice 
In order to prove prejudice, a "defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, supra, at 
964. 
In the instant matter, the Appellant had a valid suppression 
issue to raise on appeal. However, by entering the guilty plea 
the Appellant waived his right to challenge the propriety of the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Because this 
Court had not yet decided State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988), the Appellant could only preserve his suppression issue by 
going to trial. Absent the guilty plea and the waiver of the 
pre-plea denial of the motion to suppress, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result because there was neither artic-
ulable suspicion nor probable cause to support the stop of the 
Appellant's vehicle. 
The test for determining whether detainment is valid is 
whether specific and articulable facts exist which give rise to 
reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 
(Utah 1984). In announcing his ruling, the trial judge applied a 
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probable cause standard to determine the lawfulness of the stop 
of the Appellant's vehicle. The Appellant recognizes that the 
trial judge applied the wrong standard when evaluating the evi-
dence in the instant matter. A brief investigatory stop is 
permissible when officers have reasonable suspicion, based upon 
objective facts, that an individual was involved in criminal 
activity. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). In the 
instant matter, the Appellant submits that even if the trial 
court had applied the correct standard, there was an absence of 
articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, which would 
have lead a reasonable and prudent police officer to conclude 
that either of the individuals in the Appellant's motor vehicle 
had been involved in the commission of the forgery perpetrated by 
Ms. Harris at the Harmons grocery store. 
At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor, the Appellant 
pro se, and the trial court all endeavored to zero in on precise-
ly what facts formed the basis of the security officer's belief 
that the individuals in the Appellant's vehicle might in some 
fashion be connected to the commission of the forgery inside the 
Harmons grocery store. The Appellant, at a loss to understand 
the security officer's logic in connecting the occupants of the 
vehicle with the crime committed inside the grocery store, asked 
the security officer the following question: 
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Q: Then you're saying because Ms. Vigil [the 
arrested person] said there was a female out in 
a gold car and that was the only gold car out 
there, her mere statement of that lead you to 
believe that those were suspects in the crime 
that she had committed; is that your statement? 
A: It gave me probable cause to stop the vehi-
cle to find out i£ it was connected with the 
crime that just occurred. 
(8/16/88 T. 15-16). 
Although the facts available to the security officer at the 
time of the stop suggested that the arrested individual had come 
with the two individuals in the automobile, the officer was 
unable to articulate any facts which connected the individuals in 
the automobile with the commission of the forgery. The Appellant 
also asked the security officer the following question: 
Q: May I return to the other question and say 
thatfs the only reason you went out to stop 
that car, was because you wanted to see the 
people that Barbara Harris [the arrested per-
son] was merely in that car? 
A: I wanted to find out who the additional 
suspects were. She stated there were other 
individuals with her. 
(8/16/88 T. 16). 
Following the cross-examination of the security officer by 
the Appellant, the prosecutor gave the security officer yet 
another chance to articulate some facts to connect the individu-
als in the automobile with the commission of the forgery: 
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Q: Mr. Roberts, did you have any indication 
from this individual who was later identified 
to you as Barbara Harris, any indication that 
the persons out in the gold car had anything to 
do with the check? 
A: Yes we did. 
Q: What was that? 
A: Ms. Vigil [later identified as Barbara 
Harris, the arrested individual] stated that 
she had come to the store with other parties; 
that there was a female party in the vehicle, 
and that there was a female and male party in 
the vehicle and they were with her. 
(8/16/88 T. 21-22). 
Finally, even the trial judge asked the security officer 
whether he relied upon any additional facts besides the statement 
of the arrested individual that she had come with some other 
individuals in a car out in the parking lot: 
Court: Anything that was said that would lead 
you to believe these individuals were partici-
pants of the crimes? 
A: Before contact was made with the vehicle, I 
had contacted the Salt Lake City Police Depart-
ment, Detective Division, as well as our Detec-
tive Division. And the information that was 
given to me was that there was several parties 
involved in a check—I think cashing these 
checks, that there were several different par-
ties involved. And if it was possible to find 
a vehicle, stop it and find out who else was in 
the vehicle as they were accessories to this 
check writing situation. 
(8/16/88 T. 26-27). 
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Notwithstanding this testimony from the security officer, he 
still did not articulate any facts from which to conclude that 
the cashing of the check at Harmons on January 20, 1987 was 
connected in any way with the cashing of other checks on some 
earlier occasion. Moreover, the security officer testified that 
he thought he had been informed that there were several different 
parties involved. There was no elaboration by the security 
officer as to what the basis was to believe that there was more 
than one individual involved in the writing of checks. 
The Appellant submits that the facts that were available to 
the security officer at the time the Appellant's vehicle was 
stopped did not amount to an articulable suspicion to believe 
that the individuals in the motor vehicle were involved with 
either the forgery at the Harmons, or any other forgery scheme. 
The decisional law in Utah supports this view. In State v. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), a police officer was patrol-
ling a neighborhood which had experienced a lot of burglaries. 
At 3:00 a.m. the officer saw a slowly moving vehicle with Arizona 
plates. The officer did not observe any traffic offenses. There 
had been no report of any recent burglaries in the area. The 
court held that the stop of the Arizona vehicle was unlawful. 
The court explained that there were no objective facts on which 
to base a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
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The same is true in the instant matter. The Appellant 
submits that a two-tiered analysis of the facts available to the 
security guard is useful• The first tier of analysis can be 
restricted to the information provided to the security officer by 
the arrested individual. That information can fairly accurately 
be summed up as follows: A woman committed a forgery and when 
asked whether she had come with anyone else indicated that she 
had come with two individuals in a gold automobile in the grocery 
store parking lot. The Appellant agrees that these facts do 
constitute an articulable and reasonable basis to identify the 
Appellant's automobile as being the same automobile described by 
the arrested woman. However, the mere fact that the arrested 
woman had come to the parking lot with two other individuals does 
not amount to an articulable suspicion that the individuals in 
the automobile were connected in any way with the criminal activ-
ity which had occurred when the arrested woman perpetrated the 
forgery inside the Harmons store. The woman's statement does not 
provide an articulable basis to believe that the occupants of the 
vehicle solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or inten-
tionally aided in the forgery. Indeed, nothing in the woman's 
statement even suggests that the occupants even knew that the 
arrested woman intended to commit a forgery. The law is well 
settled in Utah that mere presence at the scene of a crime with-
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out any additional participation is insufficient to constitute 
accomplice liability. 
The second tier of analysis can include the security 
officer's testimony concerning accomplice participation• It is 
interesting to note that the security officer never mentioned the 
accomplice information in answer to either the Appellant's or the 
prosecutor's questioning. Instead, the accomplice information 
was only added when the judge repeated the same inquiry about 
what information the security officer had available to believe 
that the individuals in the car were participants in the forgery. 
Even then, the security officer did not explain what the basis 
was to believe that the forgery committed at the Harmons was 
connected with any other forgeries, or what the basis was to 
believe that there was more than one individual involved in the 
other forgeries. Absent such a nexus, the Appellant submits that 
even with the accomplice information all of the facts available 
to the security officer did not constitute an articulable suspi-
cion that the individuals in the vehicle were connected in any 
way with the forgery. 
In announcing its decision to deny the Motion to Suppress, 
the trial court explained it was ruling (1) that the stop was 
supported by probable cause; and (2) that the "evidence obtained 
pursuant to that arrest" was admissable (8/16/88 T. 36). As 
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already stated, the Appellant concedes that the trial court 
applied the wrong standard, U.C.A. § 77-7-15 permits police 
officers to make a brief investigatory stop of an individual if 
the officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective 
facts, that the individuals are involved in criminal activity. 
However, in the instant matter, the stop of the Appellant's 
vehicle was not supported by an articulable suspicion. Moreover, 
because the trial court ruled that the challenged evidence was 
admissable as an incident of a lawful arrest, the Appellant was 
entitled to the suppression of the evidence as fruits of the 
poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the trial court to fulfill the requirements 
of Rule 11(e)(3) on the record at the time the Appellant pleaded 
guilty necessitates setting his plea aside. Additionally, be-
cause the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel, 
his conviction should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 1990. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, by first class postage prepaid, this day of 
, 1990, to: 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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APPENDIX 1 
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court, 
and shall not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
fuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise the defendant, or his 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury tnal 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shall 
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has know-
ingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reason-
able doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be ap-
proved by the court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommen-
dation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agree-
ment being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agree-
ment has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation 
that other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and the 
reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will 
approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that final 
disposition should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, he 
shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm 
or withdraw his plea. 
(77-35-11, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 6.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend- Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
ment, in Subdivision (b), added "not guilty by pleas, plea discussions or related statements 
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill" to Rule 410, U.R.E 
the first sentence and added the second sen-
tence 
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